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THE CURIOUS CASE OF CLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION:
LAW OF THE CASE, DISCRETIONARY REVIEW, AND THE
DILEMMA FACING OHIO ATTORNEYS
Jason Snyder*

I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction, a disappointed bidder
lost a city contract regarding the expansion of the City Convention
Center. Cleveland Construction, Inc. (Cleveland) was the lowest
bidder for the contract, but the City of Cincinnati (Cincinnati)
awarded the contract to Valley Interior Systems (Valley) on the
grounds that Valley‘s bid was the ―lowest and best bid.‖1 Unlike
Cleveland, Valley had complied with the contract‘s requirement that
35% of all subcontractors included in a bid be small businesses as
part of the City‘s Small Business Enterprise Program (SBE Program).
Cleveland filed suit alleging that Cincinnati had violated
Cincinnati Ohio Municipal Code § 3-321-37(c)(4),2 which places a
cap on the difference between the lowest bid that satisfies the
requirements that make it ―best,‖ and the actual lowest bid.3 Thus,
according to Cleveland, Cincinnati had violated Cleveland‘s due
process rights because Cincinnati did not have discretion to award the
contract to Valley when Cleveland was the lowest bidder. Cleveland
also alleged that Cincinnati‘s SBE Program was a sham cover for
impermissible gender-based and race-based quota systems; therefore,
Cleveland believed its equal protection rights had been violated.4
* Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37 (2010) (requiring the City to award a
contract to the ―lowest and best bid‖ and giving the City discretion in determining what constitutes the
―best‖ bid).
2. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37(c)(4)
(2010). As will be discussed in Part III infra, this limitation only applies when the factor that
determines the ―best‖ bid is compliance with City‘s Small Business Enterprise Outreach Program.
3. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-321-37(c)(4) (requiring the City to award a
contract to the lowest bidder if the bidder that would be ―lowest and best‖ is more than 10% or $50,000
higher than the lowest bid).
4. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
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City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction involved two
interesting and oft-discussed constitutional questions: (1) whether a
disappointed bidder for a government contract has a property interest
in the contract such that due process is violated if the government
awards the contract to another bidder, and (2) whether a government
business outreach program directed at minority- or gender-owned
businesses triggers strict judicial review. This Casenote will not
focus on either of those issues. Instead, it will focus on a more
important issue that arose out of the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s
decision in Cleveland Construction, namely, how the law of the case
doctrine and discretionary review of limited issues by a court of last
resort forces attorneys into an unenviable dilemma: either expend
precious time and effort arguing issues not accepted for review or
risk having those issues decided without argument.
This Casenote will begin, in Part II, by setting out the relevant
parts of the Cincinnati Municipal Code, namely, the portions related
to Cincinnati‘s SBE and SBO Programs. Part II will also survey the
Ohio case law that lays out the law of the case doctrine. Part III will
provide an analysis of City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction,
Inc., the lower court decisions that brought it to the Supreme Court of
Ohio, and the case‘s subsequent history. Part IV will then argue that,
under the law of the case doctrine, the lower courts correctly found
that the Supreme Court of Ohio had decided the case in its entirety,
leaving Cleveland with no surviving equal protection claim.
The decision illustrates the dilemma facing attorneys arguing
before the court. In other words, when the Supreme Court of Ohio
grants discretionary review on limited issues in a case, attorneys must
wager space in their brief, time at oral argument, and effort doing
research on whether the court will limit its decision to only those
issues for which review was granted or not. If an attorney determines
that the court will not limit its decision and the court does, then the
time and effort is lost. If an attorney bets that the court will limit its
decision and the court does not, those claims for which the court did
not grant review may be lost. In Part V, this Casenote will conclude
by arguing that the solution to this dilemma is for the court to amend
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005).
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Ohio Supreme Court Rule 3.6 and reject the practice of accepting
only limited issues when it grants discretionary review. 5 Therefore,
this Casenote begins where the Supreme Court ended, with
―judgment [ ] entered for the city.‖6
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES
A. The Cincinnati Municipal Code

City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction deals with the
interplay of relatively complicated municipal ordinances. Therefore,
a brief explanation of Cincinnati‘s SBE program and Subcontracting
Outreach programs (SO programs) is necessary.
Ordinances
regarding the procurement of Cincinnati‘s contracts are laid out in
Title III Cincinnati Municipal Code (CMC) Chapter 321, while the
SBE program itself is set out in Title III CMC Chapter 323.
Like all municipal corporations in Ohio, the majority of
Cincinnati‘s contracts must be awarded through a bidding process.7
CMC 321-37(a) requires that Cincinnati awards contracts to the
―lowest and best bidder.‖8 However, Cincinnati has great discretion
in determining what makes a bid ―best.‖ Some of the discretion is
self-limiting; CMC 321-37(b), for example, allows Cincinnati to
award a contract to a bidder who does not submit the lowest bid but
uses recycled materials as long as the bid is less than $10,000 or 3%
higher an otherwise qualified, lower bid.9 Other factors used to
5. OHIO S. CT. PRACTICE R. 3.6 (West 2010) (providing that ―If the appeal is a discretionary
appeal asserting a question of public or great general interest, the Supreme Court will either: (a)
[d]ecline jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits; or (b) [g]rant jurisdiction to hear the case on the
merits, accepting the appeal, and either order the case or limited issues in the case to be briefed and
heard on the merits or enter judgment summarily.‖).
6. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ohio 2008). This note
will use the unconventional short cite of ―City of Cincinnati‖ to distinguish the Ohio Supreme Court
case from the lower court cases which will use the short cite ―Cleveland Construction.‖ This
differentiation is for note cases only; in the main text this case will, unless otherwise unclear, refer to the
Ohio Supreme Court case as Cleveland Construction.
7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.011 (West 2010).
8. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37 (2010).
9. Id.
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determine the best bid have fewer limitations; CMC 321-37(c)(1) and
(2) allow Cincinnati to use information regarding a contractor‘s past
performance and payment of a prevailing wage.
Two factors that go into the best bid calculation stem from the
City‘s SBE Program. The SBE Program allows businesses that meet
certain criteria for size and income to register as SBEs with
Cincinnati, thereby receiving benefits when bidding on Cincinnati
contracts.10 One of these benefits is that SBE status is a factor in
determining the best bid; bidders for Cincinnati contracts are required
to use SBE subcontractors for a certain percentage of the contract, as
determined by the City.11
The SBE Program also sets goals for minority- and female-owned
business (so-called MBEs and WBEs) participation, which is tracked
and reported internally by Cincinnati as part of the SO Program.12
The purpose of the SO Program is to meet the MBE/WBE goals set
out in the SBE Program. Finally, the SBE Program requires the
Cincinnati City Manager to promulgate rules for the SO Program.13
According to the City Manager‘s SBE and SO rules, compliance
with the SBE and SO Programs are factors that Cincinnati uses to
determine the best bid. At the discretion of Cincinnati, a bidder that
fails to comply with the SBE program may be disqualified from the
award.14 Cincinnati may also disqualify a bidder for failure to make
a good faith effort to comply with the SO Program, subject to the
limitation that the lowest bid that does comply with the SO Program
is less than $50,000 or 10% higher than the bid of the disqualified
bidder.15 Thus, a bidder‘s failure to comply with the SO Program
gives the city discretion subject to a price cap limitation, while a
bidder‘s failure to meet the SBE Program gives the city discretion
with no limitation.
10. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 323-1-S (2011).
11. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 323-7 (noting the annual goals for all city contracts
is 30%, but individual contracts may vary depending on the availability of SBEs for that type of
contract).
12. Id. (noting the annual goals for MBEs and WBEs are 30% of all SBEs used in construction
contracts).
13. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 323-31.
14. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37(c)(4).
15. Id.
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B. The Law of the Case Doctrine

The law of the case doctrine ―provides that the decision of a
reviewing court in a case remains the law of the case on the legal
questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both
the trial and reviewing levels.‖16 While the doctrine is not ―a binding
rule of substantive law,‖ it is ―necessary to ensure consistency of
results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling issues, and to
preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by
the Ohio Constitution.‖17
Therefore, ―Absent extraordinary
circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme
Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of
a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.‖18
Most commonly, the doctrine applies when an appellate court
remands a case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court
cannot exceed the mandate of the reviewing court; that is, it may only
consider the issues that the appellate court remanded and those that
the trial court did not decide prior to the appeal. Any issues decided
by the trial court before the appeal and not the subject of the appeal
are outside the mandate and may not be reconsidered.
The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with such a situation in Nolan v.
Nolan.19 In Nolan, a wife brought a divorce action against her
husband. At trial, all issues were decided, including a division of the
family home, and an entry of final decree.20 Both parties appealed,
and the court remanded the case for further proceedings to decide
which party actually occupied the family home.21 On remand, the
trial court restructured the entire agreement and made no findings as
to occupancy.22 The court of appeals affirmed this new decree by the
trial court. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, however, on the
grounds that the trial court exceeded the mandate given by the court
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Nolan v. Nolan, 462 N.E.2d 410, 412–413 (Ohio 1984).
Id.
State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam).
Nolan, 462 N.E.2d 410.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 413.
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of appeals because the remand order was only for findings on
occupancy.23 According to the court, ―[P]ermit[ting] the trial court to
so markedly deviate from the basis of the remand would defeat the
aforementioned purposes of the doctrine of the law of the case,
particularly that of consistency of result.‖24
The doctrine, however, also applies to subsequent appeals. Thus,
an appellate court cannot reconsider an issue already decided by an
equivalent court. For example, early in a lawsuit against a
municipality, the trial court will decide if the government is entitled
to sovereign immunity. If the trial court rules that sovereign
immunity does not apply and the city appeals the ruling, the court of
appeals settles the issue. If the appellate court affirms the trial
court‘s decision, the parties proceed to trial, and the plaintiff wins,
the court of appeals cannot reconsider the issue of sovereign
immunity when the municipality appeals the final judgment.25
The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a similar issue in State ex
rel. Sharif v. McDonnell.26 In Sharif, Judge McDonnell refused to
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law because Sharif had
untimely filed for post-conviction relief.27 Sharif appealed the
dismissal, and the court of appeals dismissed pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code § 2953.21 and ordered ―once the trial court issues
findings of fact and conclusions of law, appellant may file an
appeal.‖28 Sharif again requested Judge McDonnell issue findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and again Judge McDonnell refused.29
Sharif then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the court of
appeals to compel Judge McDonnell to issue the findings.30 The
same panel of the court of appeals granted the writ and affirmed ―that
R.C. 2953.21 did not appear to require Judge McDonnell to issue
23. Id. at 413–14.
24. Id. at 414.
25. Note, the doctrine only applies to an equivalent court and does not apply to higher courts.
Thus, a court of appeals sitting en banc or a court of last resort would not be bound by the law of the
case doctrine.
26. State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 129.
28. Id. at 128.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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findings of fact and conclusions of [sic] law because Sharif had not
timely filed his petition. The court, nevertheless, ruled that the lawof-the-case doctrine required Judge McDonnell to issue these
findings and conclusions.‖31 In affirming the court of appeals, the
court, quoting Nolan, held ―a trial court must ‗follow the mandate,
whether correct or incorrect, of the Court of Appeals.‘‖32
Further, according to the law of the case doctrine, if the Supreme
Court of Ohio does not expressly issue a remand order, then there is
no remand order.33 In Lewis, the Court noted:
We crafted our language in the [] mandate to order that the trial court
carry this judgment into execution. We did not remand the cause for
further proceedings. See R.C. 2505.39 (―A court that reverses or affirms
a final order, judgment, or decree of a lower court upon appeal on
questions of law, shall not issue execution, but shall send a special
mandate to the lower court for execution or further proceedings‖
[emphasis added]). In fact, if we had intended a remand for further
proceedings in this litigation, we would have expressly provided for that
34
action.

Therefore, if the Supreme Court does not expressly issue a remand
order, the mandate to the trial court is to enter judgment as ordered,
even if the court was incorrect in not issuing a remand order.
Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 3.6 relates to the law of the
case doctrine. According to Rule 3.6, in cases of great public interest
or concern, the court may accept a whole case for review, accept
limited issues in a case for review, or enter judgment summarily.35
III. CITY OF CINCINNATI V. CLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION, INC.

In December 2003, the City of Cincinnati (Cincinnati) issued an
invitation to bid on various contracts for construction projects as part
of the Cincinnati Convention Center. For the drywall contract, the
city required all bids to have 35% of the subcontracts awarded to
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam).
State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ohio 2003).
Id.
OHIO S. CT. PRACTICE R. 3.6.
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businesses registered under the city‘s SBE Program; thus, the
contract would go to the lowest bid that met the SBE requirement,
(i.e. the ―lowest and best bid.‖)36 As part of the SBE Program, the
city included information on Cincinnati‘s SO Program. The SO
Program informs contractors of Cincinnati‘s goals for minority- and
woman-owned subcontractors (so-called MBEs and WBEs),
estimates the percentage of MBEs and WBEs that could participate in
the contract, and requires contractors to make a good faith effort to
reach these estimates as part of the SBE Program or risk having their
bid rejected.37 While, according to the SO Program rules, the city
has discretion to reject bids, the city maintained that it has never
considered a contractor‘s failure to meet the participation goals of the
SO Program when rejecting a contractor‘s bid as non-compliant
under the SBE Program.38 Further, CMC 321-37 provides that if the
primary factor in determining the lowest and best bid on a city
contract is the SO requirements, then the city may impose a $50,000
or 15% higher price cap and award the contract to the next qualified
bid.39 The Convention Center drywall contract for subcontractors
estimated the availability of 13.09% minority and 1.05% female.40
Initially, Cincinnati received three bids for the drywall contract, a
bid from Valley Interior Systems with 34% SBE participation that
36. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37.
37. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005).
38. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37 (―If . . . evaluation determines that a bidder
has failed to achieve levels of minority and women business enterprise participation as might be
reasonable on the basis of objective data regarding availability and capacity of such businesses, the
bidder shall be subject to an inquiry by the Office of Contract Compliance‖); See Plaintiff‘s Verified
Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction and
Damages, Jury Demand Endorsed Hereon, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. March 30, 2004) 2004 WL 3686803 (detailing City‘s response to inquiries about the
inclusion of percentages for the availability of MBEs and WBEs for the drywall contract by arguing,
―[T]he City of Cincinnati‘s Disparity Study found that Minorities and Females were underutilized in city
contracting projects . . . . The minority and female business owner would also have to be certified with
the City as a Small Business Enterprise. If the availability estimates are not met, it does not mean that
the bid will be deemed non-responsive. However, we expect the utilization of SBEs to be reflective of
the availability estimates.‖).
39. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37.
40. Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint, supra note 38, at Exhibit B.
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exceeded SO availability estimates, a bid from Cleveland
Construction, Inc. with 10% SBE participation that failed to meet the
SO availability estimates, and a bid by Kite, Inc. with 0% SBE
participation that failed to meet the SO availability estimates.41
Because none of the bids met the 35% SBE requirement, all the bids
were rejected and the contract was rebid.42
Valley, Cleveland Construction, and Kite all submitted new bids.
Valley‘s second bid of $10,135,022 met the 35% SBE requirement
while Cleveland Construction‘s second bid of $8,889,000 did not.
Kite‘s second bid met the SBE requirement but was higher than both
Valley‘s and Cleveland Construction‘s bids.43
After the second round of bidding, Cincinnati awarded the contract
to Valley. Cleveland Construction subsequently filed suit alleging
that the City‗s SO Program violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cleveland Construction further alleged
that Cincinnati had impermissibly deprived Cleveland Construction
of its constitutionally protected property interest in the contract by
not enforcing CMC 321-37‘s price cap limitation, thereby violating
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44
Cleveland moved for a temporary restraining order seeking to
prevent Valley from performing the drywall work, but the trial court
denied the motion. Cincinnati then attempted to remove the case to
federal court, but ultimately, the case was remanded back to state
court. Cleveland Construction elected to wait until after discovery to
pursue a preliminary injunction.45
41. Plaintiff‘s Verified Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction,
Permanent Injunction and Damages, Jury Demand Endorsed Hereon, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. March 30, 2004) 2004 WL 3686803.
42. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-43 (providing the City discretion to ―reject any
bid for any reason or all bids for no reason‖); C INCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37
(explaining that contract should be awarded to ―lowest and best bid‖).
43. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (Ohio 2008).
44. Entry at 1, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
July 13, 2005) 2005 WL 4927190 (describing how Cleveland sought lost profits on the contract under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, declarative judgment that the SO Program was unconstitutional, injunctive relief to
prohibit the city from using the SO Program insofar as the Program used racial and gender
classifications, injunctive relief to prevent Valley from performing the contract, and attorney‘s fees and
court costs).
45. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion
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The trial court next entered a directed verdict for Cincinnati on the
issue of lost profits on the due process claim. The court also
dismissed the jury and had remaining claims tried by the bench.46
The trial court ruled in favor of Cleveland Construction on its due
process claims, holding that Cincinnati had abused its discretion
because it had awarded the bid to Valley even though Valley‘s bid
was more than $50,000 higher than Cleveland‘s.47 The trial court
also entered declaratory judgment against the city‘s SO Program for
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and enjoined Cincinnati from using the SO Program. The court,
however, held that Cleveland Construction was not entitled to
damages on its equal protection claim because Cincinnati rejected
Cleveland Construction‘s bid for failure to meet Cincinnati‘s
permissible SBE requirement and not for failure to meet the city‘s
unconstitutional SO requirement.48 Finally, the court refused to
enjoin Valley from performing under the contract.49 The court then
awarded Cleveland Construction $433,290 in attorney‘s fees.50
Both parties appealed. Cincinnati argued that the trial court had
erred on several grounds, including: (1) finding that Cincinnati
violated Cleveland Construction‘s due process rights because the trial
court had improperly applied CMC 321-37, (2) finding the SO
program created impermissible race- and gender-based classifications
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and (3) awarding
attorney‘s fees. Cleveland, on the other hand, argued that the trial
court had erred by entering a directed verdict for Cincinnati on the
issues of (1) lost profits, (2) refusing to declare the Valley‘s contract
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005).
46. Entry at 1, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
July 13, 2005) 2005 WL 4927190 (ruling that Cleveland Construction was not entitled to lost profits on
its Due Process claim following the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in Cementech v. Fairlawn, 849
N.E.2d 24 (Ohio 2006), in which the court held that a disappointed bidder was not entitled to recover
lost profits when a municipality violated the bidder‘s due process rights in not awarding the contract).
47. Entry, supra note 46, at 5.
48. Id. at 9 (describing how the City maintained that the SO Program was not subject to strict
scrutiny but stipulated that the SO Program would not survive if it were subject to strict scrutiny).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 13
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void, and denying its motion for a new trial.51 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s directed verdict on the
issue of lost profits for the due process claims and the denial of a new
trial, affirmed the rest of the trial court‘s decision, and remanded the
case for a new trial on lost profits.52
Cincinnati appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio with five
propositions of law: (1) that a disappointed bidder does not have a
constitutionally protected property interest in a public contract; (2)
that to prove deprivation of procedural due process rights, a
disappointed bidder must establish that the government entity did not
provide sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard; (3) that a
disappointed bidder ―cannot recover lost profits in a 42 U.S.C. 1983
action for deprivation of procedural due process‖;53 (4) that a plaintiff
does not have standing to seek an injunction against the operation of
a municipal corporation unless the plaintiff pleads imminent injury in
fact; and (5) that a subcontracting outreach program is not
impermissibly race-based or gender-based when all bidders have an
equal opportunity to comply with the subcontracting outreach
program and the program does not create a preference. The court
granted discretionary review of propositions (1) and (3).
The court never mentioned the city‘s SO Program or that CMC
321-27‘s price cap limitation was meant only to apply to the SO
Program. Instead, the court simply held that a because the Cincinnati
Municipal Code and the procurement forms all indicate that
Cincinnati has wide discretion in awarding all contracts, the city did
not abuse its discretion in awarding the contract to Valley, and
therefore, Cleveland Construction did not have the constitutionally
protected property interest necessary to prevail on a due process
claim.54 Since Cleveland did not have a protected property interest,
the court chose not to decide whether a disappointed bidder was
51. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 864 N.E.2d 116, 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
52. Id. at 133–34 (explaining that the trial court erred on the issue of lost profits because the
Ohio Supreme Court‘s holding in Cementech applied only to state law claims).
53. Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction by Defendant–Appellant City of Cincinnati at 7–14,
City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., No. 07-0114 (Ohio July 16, 2007) 2007 OH S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 268.
54. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ohio 2008).
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entitled to lost profits in a § 1983 action. According to the court,
―[t]he judgment of the court of appeals is therefore reversed, and
judgment is entered for the city.‖55
Cleveland Construction
recognized that the Supreme Court of Ohio had not issued a remand
order and moved for reconsideration and clarification.56 The motion
was denied.57
Cleveland returned to the trial court to set a trial date for lost
profits on its equal protection claim, which Cleveland argued
survived the court‘s decision since the court did not accept the issue
for review, and the issue had last been remanded by the court of
appeals for a new trial.58 The court denied the motion and entered
judgment for Cincinnati ―[c]onsistent with the Supreme Court of
Ohio‘s decision.‖59
Cleveland appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Prior to
the hearing, however, Cleveland sought to have Judge Mallory
removed from the case because his brother, Mark Mallory, is the
Mayor of Cincinnati.60 Justice Pfeifer rejected Cleveland‘s Affidavit
of Disqualification, but in doing so he noted:
[T]he apparent confusion among the parties regarding what matters are at
issue before Judge Mallory and the other judges on the appellate panel.
Judge Mallory and the attorneys for Cleveland Construction and the City
of Cincinnati disagree as to the exact issues that remain for the court of
appeals to resolve. This confusion stems, no doubt, from the various
ruling of the trial court, the court of appeals in the first appeal, and this
Court [sic]. Nevertheless, although it is not entirely clear whether
Cleveland Construction‘s equal protection claim is still alive or was
extinguished by these prior rulings, that question is not dispositive for

55. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
56. OHIO APP. R. 26 (2010).
57. Reconsideration Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 2007-0114 (Ohio
Aug. 8, 2008).
58. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 864 N.E.2d 116, 122-23 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
59. Entry Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion to Set a Trial Date and Entering Judgment for Defendant
City of Cincinnati, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May
18, 2009) (denying motion for new trial).
60. Judgment Entry at 2, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-0900419; 10-AP012 (Ohio April 21, 2010) (denying the disqualification of Judge Mallory).
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61

purposes of this affidavit-of-disqualification proceeding.

Thus, the court of appeals was set for its second hearing on
Cleveland Construction.
The court of appeals noted that Cleveland had argued in its motion
for reconsideration that the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision
appeared to enter judgment for Cincinnati on all claims, but that the
equal protection claim had not been accepted for review. Therefore,
the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and
entered judgment for Cincinnati.62 Cleveland Construction appealed
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, but the court denied certiorari 5–2.63
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Dude, Where’s My Claim?

Cleveland‘s equal protection claim effectively disappeared. After
the first appeal, Cleveland was awaiting a trial on damages for its
equal protection and due process claims. When the Supreme Court
of Ohio granted certiorari, Cleveland could have expected, at worst,
to lose its due process claim but still sit for trial on the equal
protection claim. Yet, despite never arguing the merits of the equal
protection claim in front of the court, judgment was entered against
Cleveland on that claim.
There is no doubt that the second decisions of the trial court and
the appeals court were both correct. Under the law of the case
doctrine, lower courts do not have the authority to exceed the
mandate of a superior court, even if the decision is wrong.64 At the
same time, a remand order is only issued by the Supreme Court of
Ohio when it does so expressly.65 Therefore, when the court orders
―judgment for the city,‖ and does not issue a remand order, then the
61. Id. at 4.
62. Judgment Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-090419 (Ohio Ct. App.
April 30, 2010).
63. Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 2010-1019 (Ohio Sept. 29, 2010)
(declining jurisdiction).
64. State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127, 128 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam).
65. State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 201–02 (Ohio 2003).
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trial court is bound to enter judgment and no more. Similarly, the
court of appeals is bound by the Court‘s mandate and can do nothing
to reverse the decision of the trial court.
Of course, the Supreme Court of Ohio did not exceed its authority
by entering judgment for Cincinnati. According to Ohio Supreme
Court Practice Rule 3.6, when the court accepts ―a case public or
great general interest‖ for review, the court may ―order the case or
limited issues in the case to be briefed and heard on the merits or
enter judgment summarily.‖66 Rule 3.6 does not require the court to
hear any issue in a case before granting judgment.67 Therefore, the
court can, at its prerogative, enter judgment without hearing an issue.
Thus, the lower courts did not make Cleveland‘s equal protection
claims disappear.
B. Poorly Conceived Decision

If the lower courts were not Harry Houdini, then the Supreme
Court must have been. But was the trick a sleight of hand or a slip of
the tongue? In other words, did the court perceive an equal
protection claim that it saw as frivolous and make it disappear, or did
the court intend only to reiterate a recent holding68 but inadvertently
banish Cleveland‘s equal protection claim to the nether world along
with the due process claim?
Several factors point toward the court using an intentional sleight
of hand. First, the court was aware of the equal protection claim; one
of Cincinnati‘s propositions of law, albeit one not accepted for
review, dealt with equal protection issues. Second, Cleveland asked
the court for clarification to prevent losing its equal protection
argument. Finally, if the court inadvertently destroyed Cleveland‘s
equal protection claim, it could have granted review a second time
66. OHIO S. CT. PRACTICE R. 3.6 (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (providing full text of relevant provisions). Note
that the Court may both decline jurisdiction or ―[g]rant jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits,
accepting the appeal, and . . . enter judgment summarily.‖ Id. (emphasis added). In other words, once
the Court has granted jurisdiction it may ―either order the case or limited issues in the case to be briefed
and heard on the merits or,‖ instead of ordering the case to be briefed and heard, enter judgment. Id.
(emphasis added).
68. Cementech, Inc. v. Fairlawn, 849 N.E.2d 24, 27–28 (Ohio 2006).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/9

14

Snyder: THE CURIOUS CASE OF CLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION: LAW OF THE CASE, DIS

2011]

CASENOTE—CURIOUS CASE OF CLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION

331

and explicitly remanded the case for proceedings on the equal
protection claim.69
On the other hand, the opinion itself gives no indication that the
court considered the equal protection claim. For instance, the court
did not address relevant Cincinnati Municipal Code provision CMC
321-37(c)(4), which provides:
In the event that the selection of the lowest and best bidder is based
primarily upon the [SO requirements], the contract award may be made
subject to the following limitation: the bid may not exceed an otherwise
qualified bid by ten (10%) percent or Fifty Thousand Dollars
70
($50,000.00), whichever is lower.

The court conflated the SBE and SO program, however, and held
that the price cap limitation applies to the SBE Program.71 In fact,
the court never discussed the difference between the SBE and SO
Programs.
Instead, it interpreted CMC 321-37(c)(4) as a
discretionary price cap.
According to the court, ―[t]he
[interpretation], advanced by the city, is that Cincinnati Municipal
Code 321-37(c)(4) is merely a limitation that the city may impose
upon a contract at its discretion (‗the contract award may be made
subject to‘ a cap).‖72
Second, the court never mentioned Cleveland‘s equal protection
claim. It simply denied review of that claim and never mentioned it
again. Finally, Justice Pfeifer recognized the confusion in his
judgment entry on Cleveland‘s Affidavit for Disqualification. As
noted above, Justice Pfeifer understood the confusion as stemming
from the multitude of decisions from various courts. According to
Justice Pfeifer, Cleveland‘s Motion to Set Trial Date for Issues
Remanded for New Trial ―is premised on its belief that there remains
69. An astute observer may realize that, had the Court granted certiorari a second time, the issue
before the Court would have been whether the trial court improperly refused to set a date for trial on the
equal protection claim, and so it would be improper for the Court to decide whether the equal protection
claim still existed. A more astute observer would realize that, under Cleveland Construction, the issue
before the Court no longer limits what issues the Court decides.
70. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37. The quote should read, ―factors 3 or 4‖ in
place of [SO Program]. Factor 3 is unrelated; it involves non-discrimination practices in hiring. Factor
for is the SO Program, not the SBE Program.
71. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ohio 2008).
72. Id. at 1071–72.
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a viable damages claim stemming from the trail court‘s finding that
the race- and gender-based classifications in Cincinnati‘s SBE
Program violated equal protection.‖73
However, given the subsequent procedure, it is best to assume that
the court intentionally killed Cleveland‘s claim. While the case‘s
history provides strong arguments on both sides, it would have been
intellectually dishonest of the court to deny Cleveland‘s motion for
clarification or deny certiorari a second time if the court had
inadvertently destroyed the equal protection claim. It is better to
believe that the court intentionally entered judgment for Cincinnati
on all claims, rather than believe the court attempted to cover up a
mistake by not clarifying its decision.
C. They’re Making Another Sequel?

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently denied certiorari on
Cleveland‘s second appeal.74 But that was not the end of Cleveland‘s
possible claims. Originally, the trial court awarded Cleveland
$433,000 in attorney‘s fees. The court of appeals affirmed the
award.75 Upon first review, the Supreme Court of Ohio did not
accept this issue.
As already discussed, the trial court denied Cleveland‘s Motion to
Set a Date for Trial, the only issue before the court at the time.
Similarly, in Cleveland‘s second appeal, the only issue before the
First District Court of Appeals was whether the trial court improperly
denied Cleveland‘s motion.
Thus, the courts have awarded
Cleveland attorney‘s fees; and that award has never been vacated or
reversed. Cleveland could legitimately return to the trial court and
demand its award. It is unlikely, however, that Cleveland lost its
equal protection claim, but that somehow it won the award of

73. Judgment Entry at 4, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-0900419; 10-AP012 (Ohio April 21, 2010). Note that ―SBE Program‖ should read ―SO Program.‖
74. Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 2010-1019 (Ohio Sept. 29, 2010)
(denying jurisdiction).
75. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 864 N.E.2d 116, 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
(―[W]e reverse the trial court‘s entry of a directed verdict . . . . We remand the cause for new trial on the
issue of liability and damages . . . . In all other respects, the court‘s judgment is affirmed.‖).
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attorney‘s fees. Still, just because Cleveland will not retain the
award does not mean that Cleveland‘s claim to the award is
illegitimate.
D Consistent Litigator: The Dilemma Apparent

Returning to the discussion in Part IV.B, a reading of Cleveland
Construction consistent with the court intentionally destroying
Cleveland‘s equal protection claim and its award of attorney‘s fees is
only possible under the following assumptions: (1) the court intended
to rule on Cleveland‘s equal protection claim, even though it did not
do so explicitly and did not accept the proposition of law for review
and (2) Justice Pfeiffer was being coy when he said that the existence
of the equal protection claim was the premise behind Cleveland‘s
Motion to Set a Trial Date.76
Just because the court did not accept Cleveland‘s equal protection
claim for review does not mean that Cleveland and Cincinnati failed
argue the point. In fact, both parties argued the equal protection issue
in their merit briefs. In its merit brief, Cleveland claimed:
[T]he undisputed facts establish that (1) the City based the drywall
contract award on Valley‘s compliance with the subcontracting outreach
percentages, and (2) Valley‘s bid exceeded the monetary cap of CMC
321-37 [sic] by twenty-four times. The City awarded the drywall contract
to Valley, rather than Cleveland, and ignored the fact that it had no
discretion under CMC 321-37 [sic], so it could achieve race and genderconscious subcontracting percentage goals that, at the time, were part of
the City‘s SBE Program. Both the trial court and the First District Court
of Appeals determined that these goals violated the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution‘s 14th Amendment by encouraging and
pressuring all bidders, including Cleveland, to discriminate based on race
and gender in order to obtain the SBE Program‘s subcontracting outreach
77
percentages.

76. Alternatively, Justice Pfeiffer could have been as confused as Cleveland, since he dissented
in City of Cincinnati.
77. Merit Brief for Appellee-Respondent Cleveland Construction, Inc. at *3–*4, City of
Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., No. 07-0114 (Ohio Sept. 4, 2007) 2007 OH S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
405 (alterations in original).
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Cleveland continued later, ―[T]he equal protection violations were
also obvious at that point because the City‘s program document, the
SBE Rules and Guidelines, as well as the forms from the rules and
Guidelines incorporated within the bid documents, stated racial goals
and preferences on their face.‖78 Even though the court did not
accept the equal protection issue for review, Cleveland at least
presented the issue.
Further, both parties included the opinions of the trial court and the
court of appeals as appendices. The trial court had found that, while
Cincinnati‘s SO Program violated the Equal Protection Clause,
Cleveland did not lose the contract because of the unconstitutional
SO Program, but rather because of the constitutional SBE Program.
In other words, the violation of Cleveland‘s equal protection rights
did not damage Cleveland in any way. According to the trial court,
―Cleveland Construction failed to establish that Cincinnati‘s race and
sex based [sic] classification (as opposed to Cincinnati‘s small
business preference) resulted in the loss of the contract at issue.‖79
The court of appeals reversed, but in doing so, the court never
actually discussed the issue. Instead, the court noted that Cleveland
had appealed the trial court‘s finding on causation during a
discussion of the directed verdict on the due process claim.80 Rather
cryptically, the court of appeals sustained the assignment of error
without even noting that it related to the equal protection, and not the
due process, claim.
Thus, the court may have understood Cleveland‘s equal protection
claim was ultimately doomed. No remand order would have changed
the fact that Cincinnati awarded the contract to Valley because
Valley met the permissible SBE requirements and Cleveland did not.
Cleveland could not present evidence that Cincinnati never used the
SO Guidelines, let alone present evidence that Cincinnati awarded
the contract to Valley based on the SO Guidelines. Consistent with
all the material in the record and Cleveland‘s presentation of the
78. Id. at *29; see also id. at *33 n.111 (citing to the equal protection claim in W. H. Scott
Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Jackson, 199 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999)).
79. Final Judgment Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. Aug. 19, 2005).
80. Cleveland Constr., 864 N.E.2d at 130–31.
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equal protection issue in its merit brief, the court may have decided
there was no need to remand the issue when Cleveland had no chance
of success.
Yet, the consistent reading makes the dilemma facing attorneys
more apparent. That is, attorneys have two options when the court
accepts limited issues for discretionary review: (1) either argue the
issues not accepted for review or (2) argue only the issues accepted
for review. Thus, the choice creates four outcomes an attorney can
face in front of the Ohio Supreme Court. If the attorney argues the
unaccepted issues and the court does not decide the issues, then the
attorney has wasted time and effort preparing the arguments.81 If the
attorney argues the unaccepted issues and the court decides the
issues, then the attorney may be in position to win the case, but,
assuming both parties‘ argue unaccepted issues, there is an equal
chance they will lose. On the other hand, if the attorney does not
argue unaccepted issues, and the court decides the issues, then the
party is at risk of having the issue decided against them without ever
giving an argument.82 At the same time, if the attorney acts
reasonably and does not argue unaccepted issues, and the court does
not decide the unaccepted issues, then the attorney is merely held
even—the party neither gains nor loses anything. Undoubtedly, this
is the outcome in the vast majority of cases, but it may not always be
the safest bet.
Cleveland had a potential claim that was remanded by the court of
appeals and not accepted for review by the court. Comparably, the
attorney‘s fees are a nominal amount considering Cleveland would,
in effect, be making the exact argument it had already made before
the court of appeals. The cost of protecting against having the issue
adversely decided without argument is well worth it, even though, in
this case, it was to no avail for Cleveland.83

81. And, in some cases, clients may be charged additional fees.
82. Alternately, the issue could be decided in their favor.
83. I grant, of course, that Cleveland hardly argued the issue before the court. At most
Cleveland presented the issue to the court. Nonetheless, the author believes Cleveland would agree the
cost of attorney‘s fees incurred while arguing the equal protection issue before the Court would have
been well worth it, considering the City would have had to pay these costs had Cleveland ultimately
prevailed.
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E. The Solution

The dilemma is not caused by the doctrine of law of the case; the
real culprit is granting discretionary review on limited issues in a
case. In other words, Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 3.6(B)(3) is
the problem. The Rule provides:
[I]f the appeal is a discretionary appeal asserting a question of public or
great general interest, the Supreme court will either: (a) Decline
jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits; or (b) Grant jurisdiction to
hear the case on the merits, accepting the appeal, and either order the case
or limited issues in the case to be briefed and heard on the merits or enter
84
judgment summarily.

The problem is with the practice of granting review of limited issues
in a case, not the doctrine of the law of the case.
This Casenote is not the first time that the practice of accepting
limited issues has been criticized. In Meyer v. United Parcel Service,
Justice Pfeifer said:
I disagree with this Court‘s [sic] practice of picking and choosing, within
a case, the issues we are willing to review. If a case is worthy of review,
in the interests of providing justice to the parties and because, until we
see the entire record, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the interplay
85
of various issues, all appealed issues should be before us.

More recently, Justice Pfeifer claimed the Court had done away
with limited reviews. According to Justice Pfeifer, ―[a]pparently a
majority of this Court [sic] now agrees with my dissent in Meyer
because, even though this court accepted jurisdiction over [only one
proposition of law], the majority opinion also addresses [the other
unaccepted propositions of law].‖86
But the process is not complete. Even if the Justice Pfeifer is
correct and the court no longer accepts limited issues for appeal, the
court still claims it does and acts accordingly. Justice Pfeifer

84. OHIO S. CT. PRAC. R. 3.6.
85. Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 N.E.2d 106, 118–19 (Ohio 2009) (Pfeiffer, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original).
86. State ex rel. Associated Builders & Contrs. of Cent. Ohio v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Comm‘rs,
926 N.E.2d 600, 610–11 (Ohio 2010) (Pfeiffer, J., dissenting).
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continued:
I do not disagree with that approach; in fact, I applaud it. But wouldn‘t it
be better for parties and their attorneys if this Court [sic] accepted
jurisdiction without limitation? The current practice is confusing.
Attorneys don‘t know whether they should argue issues that aren‘t before
us; based on this case, they should. Attorneys also don‘t know whether
they can safely ignore issues that we have told them are not before us;
87
based on this case, they shouldn‘t.

Had Justice Pfeifer‘s warning come before the court accepted
Cincinnati‘s appeal, Cleveland may have more fully argued its equal
protection claim, perhaps resulting in a judgment entered in its
favor.88 The Supreme Court of Ohio recognizes the dilemma; the
question is whether the court will do anything to address it.
V. CONCLUSION

In City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction, the Supreme
Court of Ohio exercised its discretion under Rule 3.6 and accepted
only Cleveland‘s due process claim. However, the court also
exercised its discretion under Rule 3.6 to enter judgment summarily.
In doing so, the law of the case doctrine dictates that the court
destroyed Cleveland‘s equal protection claim without having ever
heard arguments on the issue. The practice of accepting only limited
issues for discretionary review but then entering judgment on an
entire case creates a dilemma for attorneys: either argue unaccepted
issues or risk losing them. The solution to the dilemma is simple—
the Supreme Court of Ohio should amend Ohio Supreme Court
Practice Rule 3.6 to only allow for the acceptance of an entire case
for review.

87. Id. (alteration in original).
88. Because the City had already stipulated that the SO Program would not survive strict
scrutiny, if the Court had held that the SO Program was subject to strict scrutiny, there would have been
no issues of fact or law regarding the equal protection claim left to decide.
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